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THE PROBLEM OF NO BEST WORLD 
William L. Rowe 
Professors Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder hold that there is no reason 
to believe that it is logically impossible for an essentially omnipotent, om-
niscient, morally unsurpassable being to create a world that is morally infe-
rior to some other world he, or some other possible being, could have created. 
They try to show this by imagining an omnipotent, omniscient good being, 
Jove, who creates a good world by using a randomizing device. They then 
argue that there is no reason to think that Juno and Thor (other omnipotent 
beings who happen to create better worlds) would be morally superior to 
Jove. I argue that in the case of Thor, once we explicitly acknowledge his 
omniscience as well as his omnipotence, we do have a reason to think that 
he is morally superior to Jove. Hence, I conclude they have failed to show 
how an unsurpassable being can create a surpassable world. 
Professors Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder hold that there is no reason 
to believe that it is logically impossible for an essentially omnipotent, omniscient, 
morally unsurpassable being to create a world that is morally inferior to some 
other world he, or some other possible being, could have created.) They argue 
for this view by supposing that an omnipotent, omniscient being, Jove, con-
fronted with an infinite number of increasingly better possible worlds from which 
to select, decides to create one of these worlds by using a randomizing device. 
Being good, Jove has no interest in creating a world that isn't good.2 Each of the 
infinite number of good worlds is assigned a positive natural number beginning 
with 'I' for the least good world, '2' for a slightly better world, and so on. Jove 
uses the randomizing device to pick one of these good worlds, and, as a result, 
world no. 777 is created. Now, of course, Jove could have created a morally 
better world. But they think that it does not follow from this fact that Jove is 
morally surpassable. That is, from the fact that Jove could have created a morally 
better world than the world he did create (no. 777), they think that it does not 
follow that it is logically possible for there to have existed a being with a degree 
of moral goodness in excess of Jove's.) 
In support of their view the Howard-Snyder's invite us to consider other 
possible omnipotent, omniscient4 world creators, Juno and Thor, and argue 
that although they produce morally better worlds than Jove, they are not 
morally better creators. Juno does just what Jove did but her randomizing 
machine happens to select a better world, no. 999. Thor doesn't use a ran-
domizing machine but selects world no. 888 over Jove's world no. 777 be-
cause he sees that it is better and prefers creating no. 888 to creating any 
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lesser world. Even though Juno ends up producing a better world than Jove, 
the Howard-Snyder's are clearly right in viewing Jove and Juno as morally 
equivalent. But what of Thor? From their discussion it would seem that Thor 
is morally superior to Jove and Juno, for it looks as though Thor's degree of 
moral goodness is such that he is not prepared to settle for world no. 777 unless 
he is unable to create a better world. But the fact that Jove intentionally included 
worlds numbered 1 - 777 as possibilities for selection by his randomizing ma-
chine shows that Jove is morally prepared to settle for any of the worlds from I 
- 777 even though he is able to create a better world.5 So, it does appear that, 
other things being equal, Thor is a morally better being than Jove.6 
I noted earlier that our authors do not explicitly make Juno and Thor 
epistemically equivalent to Jove. This is unfortunate for it leads them to 
impute a principle of action to Thor that cannot possibly apply to an omnipo-
tent, omniscient being who chooses to create from among infinitely many 
progressively better worlds. Thus they say: 
The important point to see here is that given a choice between infinitely many 
progressively better worlds to create, Jove wisely rejects Thor's principle that 
if there's a better world than w, don't create w, ... because that principle in 
that context would lead him (and Thor, were he rational) to do nothing, which 
is far worse than using the randomizer. (6) 
Now if the principle in question, "if there's a better world than w, don't create 
w," were Thor's guiding principle, then Thor could not be omniscient and 
create anything-for, as the authors say, Thor is facing "Jove's choice," the 
choice of selecting among infinitely many progressively better worlds. But 
once we do provide a level playing field for Thor and Jove, specifying that 
Thor, like Jove, is omniscient as well as omnipotent, we see that given his 
selection of world no. 888, no such principle can be motivating Thor. (For, 
knowing that he must select among infinitely many progressively better 
worlds, such a principle would prohibit Thor from creating the world he does 
create, no. 888.) Rather, Thor's degree of moral goodness presumably is such 
that he is prepared to settle for world no. 888, but not prepared to settle for 
the world (no. 777) that Jove's degree of moral goodness allows him to settle 
for. We thus have reason to believe that Thor's degree of moral goodness 
exceeds Jove's, that Thor is morally better than Jove. 
What the Howard-Snyder's may have shown-and this is important-is 
that the fact that one omnipotent, omniscient being creates a world that is 
morally inferior to the world that another such being would create does not 
show, by itself, that the first being, other things being equal, is morally 
inferior to the second. What they have not shown is that an omnipotent, 
omniscient being who creates a world morally inferior to another world it 
could have created can be morally unsurpassable. 
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NOTES 
1. Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, "How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a 
Surpassable World," Faith and Philosophy, April, 1994. 
2. In order not to beg the question at issue, the Howard-Snyder's do not assume that 
Jove is morally unsurpassable. 
3. In the context of this discussion, a being is morally unsurpassable only if it is logically 
impossible for there to be a morally better being. 
4. For some reason the Howard-Snyder's neglect to attribute omniscience to Juno and 
Thor. I assume this to be a slip. Clearly, if we want to compare their goodness to Jove's, 
we should attribute to them the infinite power and knowledge that was attributed to Jove. 
I'll return to this point in discussing Thor's degree of goodness. 
5. And the same is true of Juno, even though she accidentally ends up with world no. 
999. 
6. It is important to note that to say one being is morally better than another is not to 
imply that the second being has done anything morally wrong or violated any moral 
obligation. 
